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Mood Matters: How Syntactic Sensitivity Undermines Safety Alignment

Conference: EMNLP 2026
Paper: ACL Anthology
Code: https://github.com/klerings/syntax-jb
Area: LLM Safety
Keywords: LLM safety, syntactic vulnerability, refusal mechanism, causal mediation analysis, alignment generalization

TL;DR

This paper systematically uncovers that aligned LLMs suffer from severe syntactic vulnerability (non-imperative formulations drastically elevate attack success rates by up to +71%), demonstrates via causal mediation analysis that models internally represent harm while downstream refusal is confounded by upstream imperative syntax features, and shows that balancing post-training syntactic diversity substantially mitigates this vulnerability.

Background & Motivation

Large language models typically undergo post-training via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference optimization (RLHF/DPO) to align their outputs with human safety policies. However, established safeguards remain remarkably brittle, with attackers frequently bypassing guardrails through surface-level prompt perturbations. Recent empirical work showed that simply converting a harmful request from the present tense to the past tense suffices to break the refusal mechanism. This failure suggests that model refusals might be anchored in superficial linguistic patterns rather than genuine comprehension of harmful intent. Yet prior to this work, it remained unknown whether the past-tense failure was an isolated idiosyncrasy or an instance of a much broader, systematic syntactic breakdown across language models.

The core tension underlying this vulnerability is that safety alignment must generalize across natural linguistic diversity, but current post-training procedures appear to mistakenly entangle refusal behavior with specific grammatical forms. Human users naturally formulate queries across a wide spectrum of moods, tenses, and voices (e.g., hypothetical conditions, indirect inquiries, and nominalized requests); these variations represent legitimate communication styles rather than deliberate jailbreaks, yet they frequently collapse model safeguards. If models fail to decouple semantic harmfulness from syntactic directness, alignment remains fundamentally ill-conditioned. More critically, an urgent mechanistic question remained unanswered: when a model complies with a harmful non-imperative request, does it fail to detect the harm internally, or does it recognize the danger yet get derailed by confounding syntactic cues during refusal execution?

This work resolves this question through an extensive behavioral and mechanistic investigation. Evaluating 16 instruction-tuned models spanning 7B to 70B parameters across 8 model families on a parallel benchmark encompassing mood, tense, voice, and argument-structure reductions, the authors combine centroid probing with sparse autoencoder (SAE) causal mediation analysis to dissect internal representations. Core idea: prove via centroid probing and causal mediation analysis that models maintain robust internal representations of harm regardless of syntax, whereas refusal decisions are causally conditioned on upstream imperative features, which can be mitigated by diversifying the syntax of post-training safety corpora.

Method

Overall Architecture

The methodology progresses through four tightly integrated stages: multi-dimensional syntactic parallel benchmark construction, internal harm representation probing via centroid probing, causal feature discovery and bidirectional activation steering using sparse autoencoders (SAEs), and post-training syntactic data balancing. The input consists of semantically equivalent variations of harmful and benign requests, and the output consists of compliance/refusal decisions and the corresponding internal neural activation pathways.

%%{init: {'flowchart': {'rankSpacing': 24, 'nodeSpacing': 28, 'padding': 6, 'wrappingWidth': 400}}}%%
flowchart TD
    A["Original Request<br/>(JBB Imperative Benchmark)"] --> B["Multidimensional Syntactic Paraphrasing<br/>Mood / Tense / Voice / Argument Reduction"]
    B --> C["Cross-Syntax Behavioral Evaluation & Probing<br/>Evaluate ASR@10 & Centroid Probing Accuracy"]
    C --> D["Causal Mediation Analysis & SAE Discovery<br/>Refusal Gradient Alignment & Syntax Filter"]
    D --> E["Bidirectional Causal Steering<br/>Amplify Feature 3347 to Induce / Clamp to Suppress Refusal"]
    E --> F["Syntactically Balanced Post-Training<br/>Syntax-Mix SFT to Remove Spurious Priors"]
    F --> G["Safety & Downstream Capability Verification"]

Key Designs

1. Multidimensional Syntactic Parallel Benchmark: Decoupling Semantic Intent from Surface Syntax

To evaluate model refusal robustness against grammatical variations, the benchmark builds upon JBB-Behaviors, consisting of 100 harmful prompts across broad risk categories and 100 benign control prompts. Since all original prompts are imperatives, the authors employ Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct to systematically generate 7 syntactically distinct variants while strictly preserving the underlying semantic intent. These variants span 4 core linguistic dimensions: grammatical mood (Declarative, Conditional), interrogative tense (Present, Past, Future), interrogative voice (Active, Passive), and argument-structure reduction via nominalization (Nominalized). All variants undergo rigorous manual inspection for grammatical correctness and semantic fidelity, isolating syntactic structure from malicious intent.

2. Centroid Probing Verification: Proving Invariant Internal Representation of Harm

To determine whether behavioral failure stems from an inability to detect harm or an inability to trigger refusal, centroid probes are trained on hidden representations. Activations across all tokens at each layer are averaged to obtain layer representations \(h_l\) and mean-centered. Class centroids \(\mu_{\text{harmful}}^l\) and \(\mu_{\text{benign}}^l\) are computed from the training split. At inference time, each test prompt receives a score:

\[s_l(h_l) = \cos(\text{sim}(h_l, \mu_{\text{harmful}}^l)) - \cos(\text{sim}(h_l, \mu_{\text{benign}}^l))\]

Scores are averaged across layers, and inputs with \(s_{\text{mean}} \ge 0\) are classified as harmful. Probes trained on 70% of imperative prompts are evaluated on the 30% held-out imperative set (within-syntax) and on all 7 non-imperative variants (cross-syntax). Probing accuracy remains virtually constant at ~70% across all syntactic forms, confirming that internal harm encoding is invariant to surface syntax.

3. Causal Feature Discovery with SAEs: Isolating Upstream Syntactic Drivers of Refusal

Given that internal harm detection is intact, refusal failure must be caused by confounding signals in the refusal pathway. Recognizing that downstream refusal is mediated by residual stream projection onto a single refusal direction \(R\), the authors compute the gradient of \(R\) with respect to upstream activations (layers 1โ€“5) on Gemma-2-2B: \(\nabla_x R\). For each SAE latent direction \(d_i\) in Gemma Scope, its refusal gradient alignment is computed as:

\[RG_i := d_i \cdot \nabla_x R\]

To avoid gradient saturation, gradients are evaluated strictly on boundary conditional prompts that did not trigger refusal. To isolate purely syntactic features, candidate latents are passed through a syntax-sensitivity filter measuring mean activation differences between imperative and conditional prompts on independent grammatical mood corpora (GUM and TV-AfD). This process identifies latent 3347 at layer 5 ("imperative forms of verbs and expressions related to actions or commands") as a primary upstream driver.

4. Bidirectional Activation Steering: Verifying Causal Necessity and Sufficiency

To establish a causal link, activations are steered along candidate latent directions across all prompt token positions at layer 5. Optimal steering coefficients are determined via grid search over \([-5.0, 5.0]\) to cross the mean refusal boundary \(R_{\text{ref}}\) or compliance boundary \(R_{\text{comp}}\) without inducing representation collapse. Positively amplifying feature 3347 achieves a 100% flip rate from compliance to refusal on previously bypassed non-imperative harmful requests. Conversely, negatively steering the feature on imperative requests suppresses refusal in 23% of cases into harmless compliance and in 8% into harmful compliance, demonstrating that the refusal mechanism is bidirectionally conditioned on surface imperative cues.

5. Syntactically Balanced Post-Training (Syntax-Mix): Eliminating Data-Induced Spurious Heuristics

A systematic corpus audit across three open post-training datasets (Olmo-3, Apertus, Tulu-3) reveals an overwhelming bias toward imperative mood (59%โ€“87%) and active voice (96%โ€“97%). To address the root cause, Llama-3.1-8B is fine-tuned from scratch using LoRA (rank 16, 1 epoch) on a 10% stratified sample of Tulu-SFT-Mix. The safety subset is augmented with syntactically balanced paraphrases across the 7 grammatical variants (Syntax-Mix). This simple data-centric intervention drastically reduces non-imperative attack success rates while fully preserving general benchmark capabilities.

Key Experimental Results

Main Results

Syntactic vulnerability was evaluated across 16 instruction-tuned models spanning 8 families. Table 1 summarizes the baseline imperative ASR@10 alongside the worst-case ASR@10 under syntactic reformulation (consistently the conditional form):

Model Size Baseline Imperative ASR@10 (%) Maximal ASR@10 (Conditional) (%) \(\Delta_{\max}\) ASR@10 (%) 95% Confidence Interval
Apertus 8B 6.0 77.0 +71.0 [61.0, 80.0]
Qwen-2.5 7B 9.0 75.0 +66.0 [56.0, 75.0]
DeepSeek 7B 27.0 84.0 +57.0 [47.0, 66.0]
Gemma-3 27B 11.0 62.0 +51.0 [41.0, 60.0]
Gemma-3 12B 11.0 59.0 +48.0 [38.0, 58.0]
Apertus 70B 14.0 60.0 +46.0 [36.0, 55.0]
Llama-3.1 8B 9.0 48.0 +39.0 [30.0, 48.0]
Olmo-3 7B 0.0 34.0 +34.0 [25.0, 43.0]
Gemma-2 27B 1.0 33.0 +32.0 [23.0, 41.0]
Llama-3.3 70B 7.0 38.0 +31.0 [22.0, 39.0]
Gemma-2 9B 2.0 27.0 +25.0 [16.0, 33.0]
Tulu-3 70B 0.0 15.0 +15.0 [8.0, 22.0]

Table 2 reports the intervention results on Gemma-2-2B using feature 3347 (coefficients \([1.5, -2.5]\)):

Prompt Category Metric Declarative (Decl.) Conditional (Cond.) Nominalized (Nom.) Present Interrog. (Pres.) Past Interrog. (Past.) Future Interrog. (Fut.) Passive Interrog. (Pass.) Imperative (Imp.)
Harmful (HARM) Complied count / Flip rate (โ†’refusal) 2 (100.0%โ€ ) 24 (100.0%) 21 (100.0%) 11 (100.0%) 17 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 10 (100.0%) 100 (8.0%*)
Benign (BENIGN) Complied count / Flip rate (โ†’refusal) 70 (52.9%) 92 (65.5%) 87 (52.2%) 84 (48.8%) 83 (60.2%) 84 (52.4%) 92 (55.4%) 25 (36.0%#)

Note: For imperative harmful prompts, the table shows total baseline refusals (100) and the flip rate to harmful compliance (8.0%, whereas harmless compliance reached 23.0%); # denotes the over-refusal flip rate to compliance on benign imperative prompts (36.0%). โ€ Declarative baseline had only n=2 compliant prompts.

Ablation Study

Ablation evaluating the impact of safety training data composition on Llama-3.1-8B across syntactic variants and downstream capabilities:

Evaluation Dimension No Safety Data (None) Imperative Safety Data (Imperative) Balanced Data (Syntax-Mix) Analysis & Impact
Imperative ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.38 0.00 0.23 Imperative-only training over-suppresses; Syntax-Mix has slightly higher ASR due to reduced imperative sample count
Declarative ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.27 0.05 0.07 Both variants handle declarative well due to explicit directive intent
Conditional ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.90 0.85 0.08 Massive 77% drop in worst-case ASR (0.85 โ†’ 0.08)
Nominalized ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.68 0.56 0.10 ASR reduced by 46% (0.56 โ†’ 0.10)
Present Interrogative ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.69 0.38 0.10 ASR reduced by 28% (0.38 โ†’ 0.10)
Past Interrogative ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.86 0.58 0.10 Past-tense jailbreak neutralized (0.58 โ†’ 0.10, -48%)
Future Interrogative ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.76 0.40 0.11 ASR reduced by 29% (0.40 โ†’ 0.11)
Passive Interrogative ASR@10 (โ†“) 0.76 0.49 0.13 ASR reduced by 36% (0.49 โ†’ 0.13)
MMLU (Factuality) (โ†‘) 59.80 63.70 62.85 General knowledge fully retained without degradation
IFEval (Instruction Following) (โ†‘) 62.29 61.84 62.87 Instruction following slightly improved (+1.03)
Winogrande (Commonsense) (โ†‘) 77.82 77.59 77.98 Commonsense reasoning unaffected (+0.39)
GSM8K (Math Reasoning) (โ†‘) 58.15 56.86 59.52 Outperforms imperative-only baseline (+2.66)

Key Findings

  • Ubiquitous Syntactic Vulnerability Unaffected by Scale: Across all 16 tested models, non-imperative forms exhibit substantial safety degradation (\(\Delta_{\max}\) ASR@10 between +15% and +71%). In several families (Gemma-2, Gemma-3, DeepSeek), larger models exhibit greater vulnerability, demonstrating that scale amplifies memorization of superficial patterns.
  • Decoupled Perception and Action: Centroid probing demonstrates that internal harm detection remains virtually unchanged across syntax (~70% accuracy), proving that refusal breakdown stems from downstream decision conditioning rather than failure to comprehend harmfulness.
  • Conjunctive Refusal Logic (\(\text{Harm} \wedge \text{Imperative}\)): Steering feature 3347 triggers refusal on 100% of non-imperative harmful requests, but only flips 48.8%โ€“65.5% of benign prompts and does not cause over-refusal on everyday benign requests. This demonstrates that refusal relies on a conjunction of semantic harm and syntactic directness.
  • Corpus Imbalance as Root Cause: Post-training data across open models is overwhelmingly dominated by imperatives (>80%). Balancing syntax in safety samples reduces worst-case ASR from 85% to 8% without compromising model capabilities.

Highlights & Insights

  • Generalizing Tense Attacks to a Comprehensive Syntactic Vulnerability Theory: Expands past-tense jailbreak findings into a broader linguistic framework encompassing mood, voice, and nominalization, demonstrating that grammatical mood (conditional framing) is the most potent attack vector.
  • Rigorous Causal Mediation with Boundary-Sample Discovery: Innovatively computes refusal gradients on un-refused boundary conditional samples to prevent gradient saturation, combined with independent grammatical corpus filtering to isolate precise interpretable SAE latents.
  • Dispelling the Illusion of Abstract Alignment: Empirically proves that post-training safety alignment fails to instill general ethical principles, instead teaching superficial response heuristics conditioned on narrow grammatical structures.

Limitations & Future Work

  • Evaluation Scope and Language Limitations: The behavioral study is based on 200 prompts from JBB-Behaviors in English. Whether syntactic vulnerability manifests similarly in morphologically rich or agglutinative languages remains an open question.
  • Heuristic Nature of SAE Interpretations: Feature interpretations rely on automated descriptions from Neuronpedia; deeper causal circuit analyses are needed to formalize the full graph of interacting features.
  • Data Augmentation is Incomplete: While balancing SFT data effectively mitigates observed vulnerabilities, post-training cannot cover every conceivable linguistic and pragmatic variation. Future solutions should explore pre-training alignment constraints and architectural value grounding.
  • vs. Andriushchenko & Flammarion (2025): While prior work identified past-tense vulnerabilities, it simultaneously altered tense and mood; this study disentangles these dimensions and establishes a comprehensive causal explanation via SAE feature discovery.
  • vs. Circuit Breakers (Zou et al., 2024) & Deep Alignment (Qi et al., 2025): Standard representation-level and prefix-focused defenses fail to alleviate syntactic vulnerability because they do not account for alternative syntactic processing pathways.

Rating

  • Novelty: โญโญโญโญโญ Formulates syntactic vulnerability as a general failure mode of alignment and isolates its upstream causal mechanism.
  • Experimental Thoroughness: โญโญโญโญโญ Rigorous validation across 16 models, centroid probing, SAE gradient discovery, activation steering, and full SFT re-training.
  • Writing Quality: โญโญโญโญโญ Exceptionally clear narrative, disciplined terminology, and seamless integration between linguistic theory and mechanistic interpretability.
  • Value: โญโญโญโญโญ Highly actionable insights for designing robust safety alignment corpora and evaluating model vulnerabilities.