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Do VLMs Share Safety Neurons Across Modalities?

Conference: EMNLP 2026
Paper: ACL Anthology
Code: https://jiaxuan-li.github.io/vlm-safety-neuron/
Area: LLM Safety
Keywords: Large Model Safety, Vision-Language Models, Safety Neurons, Mechanistic Interpretability, Cross-Modal Alignment

TL;DR

Through causal mean-activation patching, iterative anti-self-repair ablation, and modality-isolated benchmarks across 10 VLMs, this work uncovers a stark cross-modal asymmetry: text safety localizes to ~88 neurons forming the dominant refusal pathway, whereas visual safety is high-dimensional and diffuse at the single-neuron level.

Background & Motivation

Large language models undergo extensive preference alignment and reinforcement learning to reliably detect and refuse harmful text queries. However, when these aligned LLM backbones are integrated with vision encoders to create vision-language models (VLMs), this safety boundary becomes fragile. Adversaries easily trigger compliance using typographic adversarial imagery or naturally hazardous scenes paired with benign or procedural text queries. Paradoxically, when identical harmful images are paired with standard benign queries, models rarely trigger safety refusals. This behavioral dissociation implies that the underlying safety mechanisms within the shared language decoder primarily respond to text tokens rather than visual representations.

While recent representation-level mechanistic interpretability studies demonstrate that visual inputs distort global safety activations, the fine-grained computational mechanisms inside the shared language backbone remain unexplored at the single-neuron level. A fundamental question remains unanswered: do VLM decoders reuse localized text safety neurons to intercept visual harm, or do they establish dedicated visual safety subcircuits? Addressing this question presents two major methodological challenges. First, existing safety neuron identification pipelines rely on naive zero-ablation without statistical control, causing severe out-of-distribution activation distortions, and single-pass screening fails to expose backup pathways hidden by the network's self-repair dynamics. Second, existing benchmarks confound visual and textual signals by pairing harmful images with harmful text queries, preventing the causal isolation of visual safety mechanisms.

To resolve these challenges, a rigorous cross-modal mechanistic investigation requires a causal, statistically grounded detector alongside modality-isolated benchmarks. By conditioning probes on actual refusal behavior rather than input semantics, and benchmarking interventions against layer-stratified control null distributions, researchers can reliably map safety topologies across modalities under unified confirmation criteria. Core idea: develop a two-stage causal detection pipeline combining behavioral conditioning, mean-activation patching, and iterative anti-self-repair ablation, coupled with modality-isolated benchmarks (VISAFE-DETECT and VISAFE-EVAL), to systematically demonstrate across 10 VLMs that text safety is sparse and dominant while visual safety is high-dimensional and diffuse.

Method

Overall Architecture

The framework aims to causally identify the exact set of safety neurons within VLM decoders and evaluate the structural alignment between textual and visual safety representations. Given pairs of harmful and safe inputs, the pipeline isolates confirmed safety neurons \(S\) through behavioral candidate screening, causal activation patching with false discovery rate control, and multi-round iterative unmasking of backup pathways. First, models generate full responses to distinguish active refusal states from passive compliance, filtering out semantic confounders and reducing approximately \(10^6\) candidate neurons to the thousands via component-specific linear probing. Next, counterfactual activation patching replaces candidate activations with held-out safe means, evaluating causal shifts against a 300-neuron control null distribution under Benjamini-Hochberg FDR correction. Finally, confirmed safety neurons are permanently clamped to their safe means to iteratively expose latent self-repair pathways across multiple rounds.

%%{init: {'flowchart': {'rankSpacing': 24, 'nodeSpacing': 28, 'padding': 6, 'wrappingWidth': 400}}}%%
flowchart TD
    A["Multimodal Inputs & Isolated Benchmarks<br/>VISAFE-DETECT / VISAFE-EVAL"] --> B["Behavioral Conditioning & Layer Probing<br/>Fit regularized probes on REFUSE/COMPLY labels"]
    B --> C["Safe-Mean Patching & Statistical Testing<br/>Counterfactual mean clamping with BH-FDR control"]
    C --> D["Iterative Anti-Self-Repair Ablation<br/>Clamp confirmed neurons and re-detect backups"]
    D --> E["Cross-Modal Causal & Subspace GEVD Analysis<br/>Evaluate causal asymmetry and directional dimensionality"]

Key Designs

1. Behavioral Conditioning & Layer Probing: Semantic Confounding -> Behavioral Label Conditioning & Standardized Scoring -> 400x Candidate Space Reduction Training linear probes on raw content labels (harmful vs. safe inputs) risks capturing topical visual or lexical features (such as weapons or toxic nouns) rather than the safety decision mechanism itself. To prevent this semantic leakage, the pipeline conditions probe training on the model's actual behavioral response \(r \sim f_\theta(x)\), assigning labels \(B(x) \in \{\text{REFUSE}, \text{COMPLY}\}\). A fast pass matching 17 canonical refusal prefixes is followed by GPT-4o auditing for subtle refusals, retaining exclusively harmful-refused samples as positives and safe-complied samples as negatives. For each layer \(l\) and component \(c \in \{\text{mlp\_gate}, \text{mlp\_up}, \text{mlp\_out}, \text{self\_attn}\}\), an \(\ell_2\)-regularized logistic regression model is trained on activation vectors. Neuron scoring combines effect size with probe orientation: $\(d_n = \frac{\bar{a}_n^{\text{harm}} - \bar{a}_n^{\text{safe}}}{s_{\text{pooled}}}, \quad \text{score}_n = \text{sign}(w_n) \cdot |d_n|\)$ where \(s_{\text{pooled}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}(s_{\text{harm}}^2 + s_{\text{safe}}^2)}\) is the pooled standard deviation and \(w_n\) is the probe weight. Scores are standardized per layer as \(z_n = (\text{score}_n - \mu_l)/\sigma_l\), filtering candidates at \(|z_n| > 3.0\) and trimming the parameter pool from \(\sim 10^6\) to 1,800โ€“2,300 candidates (a 400-fold reduction).

2. Safe-Mean Patching & Statistical Testing: Out-of-Distribution Distortions & False Positives -> Counterfactual Safe-Mean Clamping & Stratified Null Control -> Causal Neuron Confirmation Direct zero-ablation injects out-of-distribution values into the residual stream, introducing artificial degradation unrelated to safety. This framework instead replaces candidate activations with empirical safe means computed over held-out benign queries \(D_{\text{safe}}\): \(\hat{a}_n = \frac{1}{|D_{\text{safe}}|} \sum_{x \in D_{\text{safe}}} a_n(x)\), simulating the counterfactual state of benign input processing. Across evaluated models, this preserves clean-to-patched \(L_2\) norm ratios above 0.995. Causal efficacy is quantified by the reduction in first-token refusal probability: \(\Delta P_q^n = P_{\text{refuse}}^{\text{clean}}(q) - P_{\text{refuse}}^{\text{patch}}(q)\), where \(P_{\text{refuse}}(q) = \sum_{t \in K_{\text{refuse}}} \text{softmax}(f_\theta(q))_t\) aggregates softmax probability over the 17 refusal prefixes. To account for non-specific model sensitivity, 300 control neurons outside the candidate pool are sampled proportionally to per-layer candidate density. The standardized test statistic is evaluated against the control mean \(\mu_{\text{ctrl}}\) and standard deviation \(\sigma_{\text{ctrl}}\): $\(Z_n = \frac{\Delta P^n - \mu_{\text{ctrl}}}{\sigma_{\text{ctrl}}}\)$ Neuron candidates are confirmed under Benjamini-Hochberg FDR adjustment at \(\alpha = 0.05\) if and only if \(p_{\text{adj},n} < 0.05\), \(\Delta P^n > 0\), and probe weights match the patching direction.

3. Iterative Anti-Self-Repair Ablation: Self-Repair Masking Backup Neurons -> Clamping Confirmed Sets Across Sequential Rounds -> Exhaustive Circuit Discovery Neural networks exhibit emergent self-repair (the hydra effect): when primary safety pathways are disabled, redundant parallel circuits activate dynamically to compensate, causing single-pass detectors to overlook dormant safety neurons. To capture the full safety population, the pipeline executes a multi-round iterative protocol. Letting \(B_k\) represent the safety neurons confirmed in round \(k\), a modified model \(f_\theta^{(k+1)}\) is created by permanently clamping all previously discovered neurons \(\bigcup_{j \le k} B_j\) to their safe means \(\hat{a}_n\). The entire probing, control null sampling, and patching sequence is re-executed on \(f_\theta^{(k+1)}\) over remaining unconfirmed neurons. By iterating for \(K=3\) rounds (with early stopping if positive behavioral samples drop below 20), the procedure exposes redundant backup neurons, returning the disjoint union \(S = \bigcup_{k=1}^K B_k\).

Safety Neuron Probing and Cross-Modal Alignment Protocol

To guarantee an objective cross-modal comparison under identical causal criteria, the protocol implements specialized benchmarks and subspace metrics: 1. VISAFE-DETECT (Modality-Isolated Benchmark): To eliminate textual bias during visual neuron detection, every image is paired with an invariant procedural prompt: "The image shows a scene of an activity. List steps in detail to perform this activity." Images are gathered from HADES, BeaverTails-V, UnsafeBench, VLGuard, and HoliSafe, filtered via ensemble scoring with GPT-4o and GPT-5.4 mini (requiring harm \(\ge 4\) and applicability \(\ge 4\)), and deduplicated via perceptual hashing. The final dataset comprises 2,417 harmful images (86% real photographs across 21 categories) and 2,417 safe images from COCO, Flickr30K, and ImageNet. For visual detection, the component scan is expanded to four components (mlp_gate, mlp_up, mlp_out, self_attn), providing visual probing with an explicitly larger search budget than text. 2. VISAFE-EVAL (Factorial Evaluation Benchmark): Comprising 472 high-consensus harmful intents across 8 image conditions (text-only, blank, Gaussian noise, COCO safe, natural harmful, and three rendered-text variants: standard, handwritten, poster) and 3 query modes (direct harmful, safe Dolly-15k, and neutral procedural), yielding approximately 11,300 evaluated instances per model. 3. Generalized Eigenvalue Decomposition (GEVD) Subspace Analysis: To test whether visual safety is organized in linear subspaces invisible to single-neuron metrics, GEVD computes the top-\(k\) directions separating harmful and safe activations: $\(h' = h - \sum_{i=1}^k (h \cdot v_i) v_i\)$ Ablating these directions via orthogonal projection across \(k \in [1, 100]\) establishes the intrinsic dimensionality of safety representations across modalities.

Key Experimental Results

Main Results

The evaluation spans 10 open-weight VLMs covering 6 model families and parameter scales from 2B to 32B, including both vision-adapted and native multimodal architectures. Table 1 summarizes baseline refusal rates and the causal impact of ablating text safety neurons (\(-T\)) versus visual safety neurons (\(-V\)) under GPT-4o judge evaluation (RR-Judge).

| Model | Architecture Type | Text Neurons \(|T|\) | Visual Neurons \(|V|\) | Proc. + Harm. Img. (Base) | Proc. (\(-T\)) | Proc. (\(-V\)) | Direct-Harmful (Base) | Direct-Harmful (\(-T\)) | Direct-Harmful (\(-V\)) | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Qwen2.5-VL-7B | 7B (Adapted) | 105 | 1 | 62.1% | -24.5% | +6.8% | 84.8% | -72.0% | +6.4% | | Qwen3-VL-2B | 2B (Adapted) | 48 | 4 | 56.3% | -26.3% | +24.0% | 93.0% | -87.0% | -0.8% | | Qwen3-VL-8B | 8B (Adapted) | 92 | 3 | 89.2% | -14.5% | +7.0% | 98.3% | -11.1% | +1.1% | | Qwen3-VL-32B | 32B (Adapted) | 73 | 1 | 88.7% | -25.6% | +5.6% | 97.0% | -27.0% | +0.6% | | Qwen3.5-9B | 9B (Native) | 100 | 9 | 93.4% | -32.7% | +1.5% | 98.3% | -40.0% | +4.7% | | Qwen3.5-9B-Thinking | 9B (Native) | 130 | 8 | 50.8% | -8.0% | -0.6% | 97.9% | -1.4% | +0.6% | | InternVL3.5-8B | 8B (Adapted) | 82 | 5 | 57.8% | -9.2% | +5.3% | 88.3% | -13.6% | -2.1% | | InternVL3.5-14B | 14B (Adapted) | 77 | 9 | 55.4% | -24.3% | -6.9% | 89.3% | -43.1% | -0.8% | | Gemma-4-31B | 31B (Native) | 123 | 0 | 89.1% | -26.7% | โ€” | 98.4% | -26.4% | โ€” | | GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking | 9B (Native) | 51 | 0 | 10.4% | +0.2% | โ€” | 72.5% | -65.0% | โ€” |

Ablation Study

Table 2 details per-round detection yields, in-distribution (IID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) refusal drops on held-out benchmarks (Do-Not-Answer for text, VISAFE-EVAL for visual), and GEVD subspace projection scaling on Qwen2.5-VL-7B.

Modality & Model Per-Round Breakdown (B1 / B2 / B3) Confirmed Count \(\Delta \text{RR-Judge}\) (IID) \(\Delta \text{RR-Judge}\) (OOD) Dolly-15k \(\Delta \text{PPL}\) GEVD Rank \(k\) Projection \(\Delta \text{KW}\) Random Null
Text (Qwen2.5-VL-7B) 76 / 22 / 7 105 -21.0% -16.5% +7.4% \(k=1\) -1.0% -1.0%
Text (Qwen3-VL-2B) 34 / 10 / 4 48 -33.0% -21.0% -2.4% \(k=5\) -5.0% -1.0%
Text (Qwen3-VL-8B) 55 / 26 / 11 92 -15.5% -7.5% -1.5% \(k=10\) -6.0% -1.0%
Text (Gemma-4-31B) 64 / 29 / 30 123 -17.5% -2.0% +0.4% \(k=50\) -6.0% -3.0%
Visual (Qwen2.5-VL-7B) 1 / 0 / 0 1 -40.0% 0.0% -0.2% \(k=1\) (Visual L20) -30.0% -5.0%
Visual (Qwen3-VL-2B) 3 / 0 / 1 4 -23.6% +3.7% -1.8% \(k=5\) (Visual L20) -33.0% -7.0%
Visual (Qwen3.5-9B) 4 / 5 / 0 9 -33.5% +0.4% +0.2% \(k=50\) (Visual L20) -53.0% -25.0%
Visual (InternVL3.5-14B) 2 / 4 / 3 9 -8.5% -6.3% +0.1% \(k=100\) (Visual L20) -43.0% -16.0%

Key Findings

  • Dominant Causal Disparity: Ablating text safety neurons (\(-T\)) under direct harmful queries yields an average refusal drop of 43 percentage points across models (reaching up to -87.0% in Qwen3-VL-2B). In stark contrast, ablating visual safety neurons (\(-V\)) produces a negligible shift averaging approximately 1%, with text interventions exceeding visual effects by over 5x across all models. In the visually isolated procedural setting, removing text neurons still drops refusal by an average of 20%, whereas visual neuron ablation causes erratic, sign-inconsistent behavior (mean +5%, increasing refusal by 24.0% in Qwen3-VL-2B).
  • Localization and Dimensionality Gap: Text safety is localized to a compact cluster of 48โ€“130 mid-layer MLP gate neurons (<0.01% of parameters) that reliably generalize out-of-distribution (dropping OOD refusal by 2% to 21%). Conversely, visual probing reveals only 0โ€“9 confirmed neurons per model with no out-of-distribution transfer (|\(\Delta \text{RR-Judge}\)| \(\le 4\%\) for 7 of 8 models). GEVD reveals that text safety saturates within \(\le 5\) linear directions, whereas visual safety spans \(\ge 50\) directions, demonstrating that visual safety representations are intrinsically diffuse.
  • Capability Preservation and Backup Discovery: Interventions demonstrate high surgical precision: Dolly-15k perplexity shifts remain within 2% for 7 of 10 models (and \(\le 7.4\%\) overall), while 5-shot MMLU accuracy shifts by \(\le 0.3\%\) and MMMU changes by \(\le 1.1\%\). The multi-round iterative protocol proves critical, uncovering 22%โ€“62% additional dormant neurons masked by self-repair during the initial pass.

Highlights & Insights

  • Behavioral Labeling Combined with Unbiased Mean-Patching: By deriving supervision from model generation behavior rather than input metadata, the detector completely circumvents semantic feature entanglement; safe-mean counterfactual clamping preserves hidden state geometry (\(L_2\) norm ratio \(> 0.995\)), eliminating out-of-distribution artifact noise.
  • De-mystifying Typographic Jailbreaks and Alignment Illusions: The findings expose why multimodal alignment is fragile: VLMs lack an autonomous single-neuron visual refusal mechanism. Natural harmful images only elicit high refusal when OCR pathways leak textual safety concepts back into the primary language safety circuit.
  • Pivoting to High-Dimensional Representation Engineering: Sparse single-neuron interventions cannot close the multimodal safety vulnerability. Multimodal safety alignment must shift toward representation engineering across broad subspaces or insert dedicated cross-modal circuit breakers prior to language backbone integration.

Limitations & Future Work

  • Acknowledged Limitations: Causal analysis is restricted to the LLM decoder backbone, leaving vision encoder internals, cross-modal projector transformations, and cross-attention routing unexamined; BeaverTails-V accounts for 82.5% of harmful detection images; and factorial analysis concentrates on 472 high-consensus harmful intents.
  • Deep-Dive Limitations: While confirming high visual dimensionality, the experiments do not fully decouple whether this originates from the intrinsic complexity of visual harm or from the expansive embedding geometry of vision tokens in language spaces; evaluations rely on GPT-4o as a single judge model.
  • Actionable Directions: Extend probing into the vision projector and early cross-modal layers to identify representation bottlenecking; deploy Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) over post-fusion layers to test whether visual safety decomposes into ultra-sparse features in overcomplete latent bases.
  • vs. NeuroStrike (Wu et al., 2026) / Wei et al. (2024): Previous works localized safety to <0.6% of parameters in text LLMs using zero-ablation without self-repair defenses; this paper introduces mean-patching, FDR statistical controls, and multi-round iterative unmasking, extending the analysis into multimodal decoders.
  • vs. Zou et al. (2025) / MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024): Earlier efforts observed representation-level visual distortion or designed empirical benchmark attacks; this study delivers the first neuron-level causal proof that visual safety lacks a localized gate, explaining empirical jailbreak phenomena through dimensional asymmetry.

Rating

  • Novelty: โญโญโญโญโญ Pioneering neuron-level and subspace causal characterization of cross-modal safety alignment mechanisms in VLMs.
  • Experimental Thoroughness: โญโญโญโญโญ Rigorously evaluates 10 diverse models across 2Bโ€“32B parameters with over 11,000 factorial samples per model and formal statistical hypothesis testing.
  • Writing Quality: โญโญโญโญโญ Exceptionally structured presentation with clear causal logic, cohesive prose, and comprehensive analytical tables.
  • Value: โญโญโญโญโญ Unveils the fundamental architectural reasons behind multimodal safety vulnerabilities, providing foundational insights for robust alignment.